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Plato’s Theory of Forms: Analogy 
and Metaphor in Plato’s Republic
ANTHONY JANNOTTA
I
t would be impossible to understand Plato’s writings on the nature of justice, 
beauty, or the good without ﬁrst understanding Plato’s theory of Forms. Plato 
gives us a variety of different arguments in favor of his theory; most, if not 
all, of these arguments are analogical. I will explicate two such arguments, 
the sun analogy and the argument for the Forms found in book X, evaluating 
each as they are discussed. The evaluation will be geared toward cogency and 
consistency. First, though, I brieﬂy explain Plato’s theory of Forms in general 
before examining these arguments. Ultimately, I will conclude that they illustrate 
both the relationship between the Forms and their instantiations, and among the 
Forms themselves, namely, the relationship between the good and the other Forms, 
but the arguments do not prove Plato’s ontology. From examining only these two 
arguments, it is clear how the Forms would function if they did exist, but the 
arguments themselves do not establish this existence, and, as a consequence, the 
arguments have limited persuasive power.
The Theory of Forms in General:
Before we address the Forms directly, let’s ﬁrst layout Plato’s metaphysical 
and epistemic framework from the bottom up.1 Plato makes a distinction 
between the sensible world and the supersensible world; he calls the former 
the “visible” and the latter the “intelligible.” The visible is further divided into 
shadows or images and their corresponding objects; for example, the shadow, 
reﬂection, or painting of a tree and the tree itself. He divides the intelligible 
into mathematical objects and the Forms; for example, conceptual ideas of 
circles are located in the former, and the ideal, universal circle is located in 
the latter.
There is a faculty of the soul or species of cognition corresponding to each of 
these. Plato links images with imagination and perception (eikasia); objects 
with belief (pistis), mathematics and logic with thought and hypothesizing 
(dianoia); and Forms with understanding and dialectical reasoning (noesis). 
It is important to note that the above distinctions, as intimated before, are 
both metaphysical and epistemic: the visible corresponds to opinion and the 
intelligible corresponds to knowledge. The degree of reality also increases as 
we move from images to Forms. Said differently, the Forms are what is true 
and real, therefore the Form of tree has more reality than an actual tree which, 
again, has more reality than its reﬂection.
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The Forms, then, are universal, eternal, and unchanging. They 
are perhaps best understood as concepts or essences. Take, for 
example, the concept dog.  Plato would say that each particular 
dog that we encounter in the visible world participates in the 
Form of dog; there are many particular dogs, but there is only 
one Form of dog. The fact that we employ the word “dog” 
implies that there is something common to all dogs, that is, 
some kind of dog-essence. Even though particular dogs are born, 
live, and die, the concept dog remains eternal and unchanging. 
For Plato, we can only have beliefs, and not knowledge proper, 
of dogs in the sensible realm. In order to get beyond beliefs of 
particular dogs we would need to employ dialectical reasoning 
to acquire real knowledge; and knowledge, as we will see, is 
reserved for the Forms only. So, to have knowledge of dogs 
would be to have knowledge of the Form of dog. Let’s now 
look at several arguments or metaphors that Plato provides to 
help us understand the Forms.
The Sun Analogy:
Plato’s Republic is primarily concerned with the nature of 
justice and how, by cultivating the virtues, we may foster 
inner harmony to achieve justice. Toward the end of book six, 
Glaucon urges Socrates2 to “discuss the good as [he] discussed 
justice, moderation, and the rest” (506d).3 Socrates, however, 
feels that the good itself “is too big a topic” and, by attempting 
to discuss it, “[he’ll] disgrace [himself ] and look ridiculous by 
trying” (506e). Rather, Socrates offers to discuss an “offspring” 
of the good, an offer to which his interlocutors promptly agree. 
This is the beginning of a series of analogical arguments—the 
sun, the divided line, and the allegory of the cave—which, while 
all concerned with the nature of the Forms, tend to emphasize 
different aspects of Plato’s theory. The sun analogy will be the 
ﬁrst of two arguments we’ll discuss.
Socrates begins by reminding Glaucon and Adeimantus that, 
though “there are many beautiful things and many good 
things,” there is only one Form of each such that there is the 
Form of the beautiful and the Form of the good. The many 
things belong to the visible and are not intelligible while the 
universal Forms belong to the intelligible and are not visible 
(507c).  Socrates distinguishes sight from all the other bodily 
senses because it is the only sense that requires “a third thing” 
apart from the thing that senses (the eye) and the thing sensed 
(the object), namely light. Socrates asks Glaucon “which of 
the gods in heaven” is both the “cause and controller” of “our 
sight to see […] and the visible things to be seen?” (508a). 
The answer, of course, is the sun. Socrates goes on to say that 
although sight and the eye are not the sun itself, sight “is the 
most sunlike of the senses” by virtue of their relationship to one 
another (508b).  Here, Socrates arrives at the conclusion that 
the sun is “the offspring of the good” or its “analogue” (508c). 
The good is essentially the sun of the intelligible realm. The 
analogy runs thus: “What the good itself is in the intelligible 
realm, in relation to understanding and intelligible things, the 
sun is in the visible realm, in relation to sight and visible things” 
(508c). Glaucon wants more.
Socrates attempts to expand the sun analogy. In the visible 
realm, when we turn our eyes toward dimly lit objects it is 
as though sight has left them but, “when [we turn] them on 
things illuminated by the sun, they see clearly” (508d). In the 
intelligible realm, when the soul ﬁxes its attention on things 
“illuminated by truth and what is, it understands, knows, and 
apparently possesses understanding,” but, when it is absorbed 
with “what comes to be and passes away,” the soul “opines” and 
is “bereft of understanding” (508d). What Socrates means by 
this goes back to the distinctions presented above. Things in 
the visible realm are not ﬁxed but rather constantly “[coming] 
to be and [passing] away,” which means we can only have 
opinion about these things, not understanding or knowledge. 
When the soul examines those things in the intelligible realm, 
e.g., mathematical objects and Forms, it can then be said to 
have some knowledge or understanding precisely because the 
forms are ﬁxed, eternal, and unchanging.
There is one ﬁnal point Socrates makes in the sun analogy which 
we may have already intimated. The form of the good not only 
gives to the soul the capacity to know, but also gives to objects 
of knowledge the quality of truth. The good is itself an object 
of knowledge because it is a Form, but it is also “the cause of 
knowledge and truth” (508e). The sun allows the eye to see but 
it is also itself something to be seen. In the same way the sight 
and the eyes were considered sunlike, knowledge and truth are 
considered goodlike. The last similarly between the sun and 
the good is as follows: for things in the physical world, the sun 
is both the cause of their growth and nourishment and the 
cause of their very existence; likewise, the good is responsible 
for objects of knowledge being known and the existence of 
objects of knowledge, i.e. Forms, in the ﬁrst place (509c). At 
this point in the Republic the sun analogy ends and the divided 
line analogy begins, so, before we discuss a second argument, 
let’s pause and evaluate what has been said.
Analysis of the Sun Analogy:  
In looking at this ﬁrst argument, what is immediately striking 
is the richness of Plato’s metaphor. The analogy makes 
understanding the good quite accessible but only insofar as its 
function is concerned. We know that the function of the good 
in the intelligible realm is like that of the sun in the visible, 
but we don’t know how it is that the good came to exist and 
why it has the features that it has. Plato, though, might have 
an idea as to the origin of the good but chooses not to discuss 
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it in the Republic; Socrates’ reason is simply that it “is too big 
a topic,” and to address it would both disgrace him and make 
him sound ridiculous.  
If we accept the good’s ontological status, however, the metaphor 
works on another level.  Just as we cannot look directly at 
the sun in the visible realm, we cannot be in direct epistemic 
contact with the good.  Our souls are unfortunately embodied 
and thus our senses inhibit the acquisition of true knowledge. 
It appears the best we can do is a quick glance in the direction 
of knowledge as we are unable to dwell on it.   
Even if we accept the good’s ontological status, is there any 
reason to believe that the good has the properties which 
Plato attributes to it?  Plato doesn’t really offer reasons for 
our believing that the good is the source of all other Forms 
or that it is what enables us to know them. We could argue 
that because the seer and the thing seen require a third thing, 
namely light, that this is somehow a reason that the knower 
and the thing known require a third thing, namely the good. 
This, though, in and of itself is not a reason. The analogy 
helps us understand what Plato means when he talks about the 
good, but doesn’t help us see that the good necessarily exists. 
Certainly though other concepts like “dog” or “circle” exist, in 
some capacity, why should one concept or Form be the source 
of all the others?  The way in which Plato presents this idea 
seems more like a pronouncement than an argument. As an 
analogy, however, the sun works quite well; it’s just a matter of 
accepting the good as given.
There is one other criticism of this ﬁrst argument. If the good 
is the source of all Forms and a Form itself, how can they all be 
eternal and unchanging? If the good is the source of the other 
Forms, this seems to imply that they aren’t eternal but rather 
were created by the good and thus had a deﬁnite beginning. 
This could be due to an equivocation with the word “eternal.” 
If by eternal Plato means “without beginning or end,” then 
the only Form that ﬁts this deﬁnition is the good; the other 
Forms would have had a beginning, namely, the good. If by 
eternal Plato means something like “endless,” then perhaps the 
good can produce the other Forms, but now that they are in 
existence, they can never go out of existence. Finally, it could 
be the case that without the good, if the good were somehow 
taken away, the other forms couldn’t exist. This would allow 
for all of the Forms to be eternal in the usual sense of the word. 
In any case, though, there is an ambiguity which Plato leaves 
unresolved, at least within the sun analogy.
The Forms according to Book X of the Republic:
In book ten of the Republic, Socrates ostensibly condemns 
artists; more speciﬁcally, he condemns imitators in general, 
and poets in particular, because they tend to distort what is 
true and real. For reasons I’ll discuss later, this must be taken 
as more an ironic admonition than an outright denunciation. 
Nevertheless, Socrates continues his discussion with Glaucon 
about the education of the ideal city’s guardians. He mentions 
that they had previously excluded imitative poetry and they were 
right to do so because of its destructive inﬂuence. If, however, 
the person viewing or hearing the imitative art is educated 
enough his or her knowledge will act “as a drug to counteract” 
the negative effects on the psyche (595b). Glaucon wants some 
clariﬁcation as to what exactly Socrates means by imitation. 
The usual dialectic process begins with Socrates drawing the 
distinction between a universal Form and the particular things 
that participate in that Form. The things chosen as examples 
are beds and tables. Socrates points out that we say the maker 
of beds and tables is looking “towards the appropriate form” 
rather than being the maker of the Form itself. Socrates jokingly 
suggests that Glaucon could easily become a craftsman who 
could make all the objects and artifacts in the world “if [he] 
were willing to carry a mirror with [him]” (596e). Glaucon sees 
where Socrates is going with this argument and anticipates him 
by saying that he could only make the appearance of things but 
not “the things themselves as they truly are” (596e). Painters 
would then fall into the same category because they do not 
make a particular bed but the appearance of one. A craftsman 
who makes a particular bed, however, does make something 
closer to the bed itself, but still does not make the Form of the 
bed.
Socrates asks Glaucon if he wants to continue the discussion 
of imitation with reference to the examples already given, and, 
when Glaucon agrees, Socrates lays out three kinds of beds. 
The ﬁrst is the bed a god makes, i.e., the Form; the second is 
a bed the craftsman makes, i.e., a particular bed; and the third 
is a bed a painter makes, i.e., an appearance of a bed. The god 
made just the one Form of the bed because he wished to be the 
maker of what is real and true and not “just a maker of a bed” 
(597d). If the god is the maker of the Form, the craftsman the 
maker of a bed, then what, asks Socrates, does a painter do to a 
bed? Glaucon responds: “he imitates it” (597e). A more formal 
deﬁnition of an imitator is “one whose product is third from 
the natural one,” i.e., third from the Form (597e).  
Before the conversation turns back to poetry and the tragedians, 
Socrates makes clear that the painter is concerned only with the 
appearances. The painter doesn’t paint the Forms, but rather 
“that which appears as it appears,” thus “it is an imitation of 
appearances” (598b). Said differently, the painter can only deal 
with a small part of a physical object which in turn is just an 
image. For example, the side of a bed would be a small part of 
the bed and, indeed, not the entire bed itself. The painter, then, 
works with only the image of the side of the bed.
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Analysis of the Book X Argument:
It is probably best to address the ironic element to which we 
intimated earlier. It must be the case that Plato does not agree 
completely with his denunciation of imitative arts because 
the way in which he chooses to express this idea is through 
an imitative art, namely, the dialogue. It is more likely that he 
means to address those arts which bypass the most important 
faculty of the soul, reason, and instead aim at the inferior 
part of the soul, emotion or desire. In Plato’s Ion, too, we ﬁnd 
Socrates criticizing poetry. This is largely due to the fact that 
Plato reserves knowledge for the Forms. A common belief in 
ancient Greece was that poetry contained, or was a source of, 
knowledge. As we have seen, this runs contrary to Platonic 
philosophy. Plato attacks poetry, then, for these two reasons: 
ﬁrst, poetry bypasses the best part of the psyche, that is, the 
rational portion and; second, poetry, according to Plato is not 
a valid source of knowledge. But let us return to our analysis 
of book X.
In relation to the theory of Forms, is the argument in book 
X persuasive? Again, if we are concerned with the ontological 
status of Forms, then this section of the Republic does not 
clarify the concerns raised in the middle sections. We can say, 
as I mentioned before, that the Forms, construed as concepts, 
have some existence. For instance, there is something that is 
common to all things we call beds, yet the argument provides 
no further detail.
There is one additional criticism we must discuss. If physical 
objects are inferior instantiations of the Forms, then are all 
instantiations inferior in the same way or are some closer to 
the real thing? We could have, for example, an imitation of 
dialectic, such as the Republic, but not all of the imitations may 
be inferior in the same way. We can easily conceive of a good 
imitation of philosophical dialogue, perhaps the Republic, but 
we can also conceive of a worse imitation. It seems that there is 
gradation when it comes to imitations; Is there also gradation 
when it comes to objects? It seems that there might be gradation 
for artifacts: we can imagine a better shovel, but what about 
natural objects like dogs and trees?  For Plato, does there exist 
some dog in the visible realm that is a truer instantiation than 
some other dog? 
Comparing the two Arguments:
When we compare these two arguments there seems to be a 
discrepancy between them.  If it is the case that the good is 
responsible for the existence of the Forms, does this preclude a 
god having made the Form of the bed?  It could be that Plato 
is exercising some poetic license when he states that a god 
made the Form of the bed, but he also doesn’t mention how 
the good came into existence. If the good begot all the other 
Forms, including the Form of bed, then it is not likely that a 
god had also made the Form of bed.  Plato may have had in 
mind a certain cosmogony that could explain the production 
of Forms, but it does not appear in the Republic. As it stands, 
this issue of the origin of Forms is left unresolved.
Conclusion:
The overall cogency of Plato’s theory of Forms depends largely 
on how much we are persuaded by analogical arguments. 
Analogies are useful tools for exposing the relationships 
between and among ideas, but in and of themselves they have 
limited persuasive power. We may understand how the good 
functions (just as the sun in the visible realm), but what we 
don’t understand, or at least what is not evident from the two 
arguments, is how the good came to be and why it has the 
properties it has. Plato’s dialogues, though, were written for 
a popular audience, and this, to be sure, is a good reason for 
Plato’s reliance on metaphor and analogy. His use of metaphor 
allows for a popular audience to readily understand, or at least 
begin understanding, some subtle philosophical point. For, 
after all, the dialogues are not lectures, they are stories with 
characters. This is not meant to undermine the philosophical 
import of Plato’s writing, but rather it is a suggestion of why 
Plato chose to rely heavily on metaphor and analogy rather 
than relying strictly on straightforward argument. 
Notes
 I am using the distinctions Plato makes in the divided line 
analogy (but devoid of substance) to discuss the Forms in 
general. It is important to know what the Forms are but also to 
know where they ﬁt into Plato’s metaphysic.   
2 Socrates is often regarded as a conduit for Plato. But to regard 
the character Socrates as such is potentially to undermine the 
dialectical nature of nearly all of Plato’s writings. In what follows, 
however, “Plato” and “Socrates” will be used interchangeably, 
since we are concerned with Platonic thought.
3 Plato, The Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube, rev. C.D.C. Reeve. 
Plato Complete Works. Ed. John M. Cooper. (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1997). All references are to Stephanus numbers in 
this translation.  
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